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ABSTRACT
The Arsenal Ship concept of operations is unique. The Arsenal Ship provides a
remote magazine for other joint warfare systems to utilize, with limited ability to defend
itself. Ultimately it resembles a combat logistics ship designed to sail into harm's way
ready to provide the initial "punch" as required. Therefore, it should be minimally manned
by employing the most cost-effective technology. With the requirement to reduce crew
size, a new approach to manning is required. This thesis provides an alternative approach
to manning by identifying the most cost-effective investment in automation commensurate
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As intensifying national concern over the federal deficit continues to impact the
budget for national defense, an Arsenal Ship design that is affordable to build, maintain,
and operate must be implemented. Historically, personnel costs have had great impact on
the life cycle cost of ships. Reduced manning reduces ship life cycle cost, reduces the
number of personnel placed in harms way, and limits the impact on the Navy Manpower
Plan. Therefore, an analysis of manning is required to determine the minimum optimal
manning level that supports mission requirements. This thesis provides an alternative
approach to manning by establishing the most cost-effective investment in automation
commensurate with reducing crew size to the lowest feasible level. Before manning can
be analyzed, factors such as locations ofForward Operating Bases, location of homeport,
ship deployment cycle, crew deployment cycle and special evolution manning requirements
must be determined.
This thesis selects two Forward Operating Base locations, Diego Garcia and
Guam, as rational locations considering transit time and security. San Diego was chosen
as the homeport because of its distance from both Forward Operating Bases. A "steady
state" deployment cycle was designed in which four Arsenal Ships can be continuously
forward deployed with another undergoing an overhaul in homeport for a total of five
ships. This deployment cycle also insures 100 percent coverage of two theaters. The
crew deployment cycle also resembles a "steady state" process in which crews train as a
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team and then forward deploy for 16 weeks. Special evolutions including flight
operations, underway replenishment, and General Quarters were also considered. Damage
control was determined as the limiting factor for reduced manning.
Four manning structures are identified using the Naval Postgraduate School's
Total Ship Systems Engineering Team design as a basis. These structures were used to
develop a 30 year life cycle cost curve based on crew size. A simple spreadsheet model
was designed as an alternative to the Navy Billet Cost Factor Active Component Cost
Estimation Model to assist in determining a 30 year manning life cycle cost curve. This
curve is similar to an economic supply curve. Automation cost curves were then
formulated. The 30 year manning life cycle cost curve and the automation cost curve





The Arsenal Ship concept of operations is "a revolutionary approach to warfare"
[Ref 1]. Likewise, the design concept is a revolutionary approach to Naval shipbuilding.
It is unlike any previous, or current, United States Navy ship design concept. Naval
warships are normally designed by the Navy and built by private contractors. Shipbuilders
submit proposals for construction based on the Navy's design. The shipbuilder with the
"best" proposal is awarded the contract.
The new design concept encourages shipbuilders to design an independent version
ofthe Arsenal Ship in accordance with the Arsenal Ship Requirements Document
(ASRD). One of the requirements the ASRD establishes is a maximum crew size of 50.
In the past, ships were built with the latest technology and the manning level was
determined based on manpower requirements to maintain and operate the equipment.
With the requirement to reduce crew size on the Arsenal Ship, a different approach is
required. This thesis provides an alternative approach to manning by establishing the most
cost-effective investment in automation commensurate with reducing crew size to the
lowest feasible level.
B. BACKGROUND
In July, 1996, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
awarded five design teams Phase One contracts to design the Arsenal Ship in accordance
with the ASRD. They were given six months to produce an initial proposal. On
January 10, 1997, three of five contractors were awarded Phase Two contracts to finish
designing a more detailed Arsenal Ship. Next year a single contractor will be selected to
build the prototype. This program is managed by the Arsenal Ship Joint Program Office
for DARPA [Refs. 2 and 3].
1. Requirements
The Arsenal Ship Concept Executive Summary identifies three theaters displaying
international tension which require overseas presence: North East Asia (NEA), South
West Asia (SWA), and the Mediterranean (MED). Force structure requirements for the
Arsenal Ship are based on continuous coverage ofSWA and near continuous coverage of
theMED[Ref. 2].
A primary design requirement is to reduce crew manning through the use of
innovative manning concepts. Specific topics to be addressed in this area include the
following [Ref. 2 ]:
1
.
Elimination of unnecessary functions
2. Reduction of on-board and Navy-wide manpower needs while maintaining
effective operations, readiness and ship safety
3. Effective damage control
4. Reduction of life cycle costs (LCC)
2. History
The Arsenal Ship concept is not entirely new. Similar ships were in service during
WWII and Korea. The Landing Ship Medium Rocket (LSMR) was manned with a crew
of 1 10, including 5 officers. Converted from the hull of the Landing Ship Medium (LSM),
the LSMR was equipped with up to 105 rocket launchers which included 8,000 rockets.
Nicknamed "Little Ship Many Rockets", they were designed to deliver a barrage of fire
support during an amphibious assault [Ref. 4]. In the late 1950's and early 1960's almost
all of the 48 LSMRs were sold [Ref. 5], Although the Arsenal Ship's mission is not
solely to provide fire support during amphibious assaults, the concept is essentially the
same: One ship transporting a plethora of firepower into an area of potential conflict.
C. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Using existing technology, an Arsenal Ship could be designed to operate with the
minimum manning required under existing law and practice for merchant ships. In 1983,
the Committee on Effective Manning was established by the Marine Board of the National
Research Council to investigate the manning of merchant ships. The committee reported a
statutory minimum crew often [Ref. 6]. The committee's minimum manning composition,
along with equivalent Navy personnel, is listed in Table 1
.
Merchant Navy Equivalent Quantity
Licensed Master Commanding Officer 1
Qualified Mate Qualified Officer of the Deck 3
Qualified Deck Sailor Qualified Boatswain Mate 3
Licensed Engineer Qualified Engineering Watch Officer 3
Table 1. Minimum Merchant Manning Comparison to Navy Personnel
In 1989, the Coast Guard requested an assessment of the effect of smaller
merchant crews on maritime safety from the Marine Board of the National Research
Council. Their product, Crew Size and Marine Safety [Ref. 7], includes a thorough
investigation into the 1980's innovations that allowed crews of more than 30 persons to
be reduced to crews of less than 20. They also developed a model to provide an estimate
ofminimum manning levels. The model was validated using data from a mixed product
tanker and a container ship.
The minimum manning level for an Exxon® mixed product tanker was calculated
using the model. The tanker had an initial crew of 18 persons. The model calculated the
manning requirement could be reduced to 15 crew members. Exxon® agreed a minimum
crew of 15 would be ideal. It was also noted that a crew of 15 exceeded the minimum
manning requirement of 1 1 persons to fight an engine room fire on this type of ship.
In September, 1993, Gregory Hildebrand [Ref. 8] completed a thesis analyzing the
cost benefit of a reduced active duty crew as an alternative to a civilian manning for
Combat Logistic Force Ships. He found the Navy training requirements produced Navy
sailors equally qualified as their civilian counterparts. Selective manning was determined
to be an integral element in reducing crew size. As long as truly competent professionals
are selected to fill the billets, crew reduction is feasible. Interestingly enough Hildebrand
concluded a reduced Navy crew is more economical than a civilian crew, which
contradicts [Ref. 9].
The Naval Postgraduate School Total Ship System Engineering (TSSE) team
completed an Arsenal Ship design in December, 1996. The team modified a T-AO 201
Class fleet oiler by upgrading the engineering plant and adding weapon systems. Through
automation, remote sensors and cameras, the manning requirement is reduced to 44 crew
members. The engineering plant is upgraded to satisfy the sustained speed requirement of
22 knots and to provide electrical power required by the additional weapon systems [Ref.
10].
The Smart Ship initiative is another aspect of manning that must be recognized.
The Smart Ship concept reduces manning through common sense approaches to manning
and innovations in technology. The USS Yorktown (CG 48) is the test platform for the
Smart Ship program. Matthew Fleming is completing a thesis [Ref. 1 1] at the Naval
Postgraduate School which concludes that reduced manning is risky. "A 0.54 percent cost
savings by risking the readiness of all combatants and the United States Navy seems
imprudent" [Ref. 11]. There are two major differences between the Smart Ship initiative
and the Arsenal Ship. First, the Smart Ship is a combatant designed to fight. The Arsenal
Ship is a support ship designed to deliver a large amount of readily available ordinance.
Second, the Arsenal Ship is designed to reduce the number of personnel placed in harms
way. Minimizing the number of personnel at an ammunition depot is prudent. These
conceptual differences make the approach to manning very different.
D. PROBLEM DEFINITION
"The Arsenal Ship concept is simple—build a ship with massive firepower which
increases the capabilities of Joint Forces already in theater" [Ref. 1]. Now comes the
difficult task, designing an Arsenal Ship that is affordable to build, maintain and operate.
Historically, personnel costs have had great impact on LCC. Given the basic design
structure, an analysis of manning is required to determine the minimum optimal manning
level required to support mission requirements. In order to reduce crew size to its lowest
feasible level, the most cost-effective investment in automation must first be determined.
The Arsenal Ship's mission is to provide an arsenal ofweapons to end users within
a theater of operations. "The Arsenal Ship is an ominous platform because it will have
one principal mission: to inflict overwhelming, punishing damage" [Ref. 12]. Because the
Arsenal Ship's mission resembles a fleet logistics ship more than a combatant, the manning
concept is very different from a combatant. Senior ranking, highly trained, professional
personnel must be selected to man the Arsenal Ship. Cross training must be extensive
across all ratings. Therefore, this analysis is specialized for the Arsenal Ship and is not
applicable to other warships, for example DDG-51 or SC-21. At its point of departure,
this thesis utilizes the TSSE Arsenal Ship design, with minor alterations, to analyze
reduced manning for the Arsenal Ship.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. LOCATIONS
Before explicit manning can be analyzed, location ofForward Operating Bases
(FOB) and homeport must be considered. FOB and homeport locations directly impact
ship deployment cycles and crew deployment cycles, which affect overall manning levels.
1. Forward Operating Bases
The Arsenal Ship Executive Summary identifies six possible FOB locations. FOBs
will be used for Intermediate Maintenance Availabilities (EVIAV), crew turnovers,
replenishing provisions and fueling.
Transit times from FOBs to the theaters of interest are replicated from [Ref. 1] in
Table 2. Forward-deploying ships to two locations vice three will reduce FOB overhead
costs and the number of Arsenal Ships required. After examining transit times between
the proposed FOBs, it becomes apparent that forward-deploying the Arsenal Ship to
Diego Garcia and Guam is a rational decision. Transit time to all three theaters is
minimized (24.2 days) when operating from Diego Garcia, making it the best overall FOB.
The ability to arrive in NEA within about four days is also beneficial. Diego Garcia is a
secure location since it is under long term lease from Great Britain. The ability to arrive in
NEA within three days and the fact that it is a U.S. Territory also make Guam a prime
FOB site. Assigning each FOB a primary and secondary theater of operations will ensure
continuous coverage of at least two theaters. At 20 knots, it requires less than five days
for each Arsenal Ship to transit to its primary theater. It requires less than 1 5 days to
transit to each other's primary theater. The Arsenal Ship can enter the Mediterranean Sea
within 20 days from Guam and within 10 days from Diego Garcia. However, most areas
of instability can be covered without transiting the Suez Canal. Furthermore, Arsenal
Ships returning from the continental United States (CONUS) are within seven days of the
Mediterranean Sea ifhomeported on the east coast.
Forward Operating Base North East Asia Mediterranean Sea South West Asia
Augusta Bay, Sicily 18 1 8
Diego Garcia 10 10 4.2
Guam 3 19 13
Yokosuka, Japan 2 20 14
SoudaBay, Crete 18 1 7
Sasebo, Japan 18 12.5
Table 2. After Ref. [1] Transit Days From Forward Operating Base at 20 Knots
2. Homeport
The homeport is the location for all overhauls and the Central Training Site (CTS).
It is also the homeport for the families of the deploying crews. This allows the deploying
crew to be home during training. In an effort to lower LCC, one location should be
selected as the homeport for all Arsenal Ships.
The primary Naval bases considered in this thesis are located in Norfolk, Virginia
and San Diego, California. When transit time to and from the FOBs and the theaters is the
primary concern, the homeport of choice is San Diego. The transit time from San Diego
to Diego Garcia and San Diego to Guam is 2/3 of the transit time from Norfolk. This
thesis did not take any other factors involved with locating Naval bases into account.
B. MAINTENANCE
1. Overhaul
Overhauls must be routinely conducted because of the limited maintenance
accomplished while deployed and the short IMAV periods. The overhaul will be
conducted by an overhaul crew trained specifically for Arsenal Ship overhauls. The
overhaul crew, which is assigned by the Arsenal Ship Squadron Commander, will be
responsible for maintaining a Quarterdeck Watch, Fire Party and Security Force.
Overhauls will be managed by the Arsenal Ship Squadron Commander in homeport.
Therefore, this thesis assumes overhauls will be conducted in San Diego, California.
2. Intermediate Maintenance Availability
Each ship spends one month in an IMAV to complete urgent repairs and all routine
maintenance with a periodicity of 90 days or more. The Arsenal Ship design should
include concepts which increase periodicity of maintenance requirements beyond the
normal deployment length ofthe Arsenal Ship. In this thesis, maintenance required while
deployed is reduced by increasing periodicity between maintenance requirements to 90
days. Maintenance with a periodicity of less than 90 days must be performed by the
deployed crew.
C. SHIP DEPLOYMENT CYCLES
To develop a "steady state" for Arsenal ships to operate, the following ship
deployment cycle is selected. This deployment schedule requires five Arsenal Ships.
Ships will deploy for 84 day periods with overlapping intervals and will be relieved on
station. After nine deployments each ship will have four weeks to return to homeport for
an overhaul. The percentage of time a ship is in each phase of a deployment cycle is
provided in Table 3. The transit phase is the time allotted to transit to and from overhauls
conducted in homeport. Each Arsenal Ship is operational 60 percent ofthe time using this
method. Three of five ships are deployed at any one time. An additional ship is in a
maintenance availability and can be deployed within a few days depending on the type of
maintenance in progress. This provides 100% coverage oftwo theaters of operation at all
times with a ready recall ship available. Appendix A provides a five ship deployment
schedule. The initial forward deployments in Appendix A are irregular lengths allowing a
steady state process to develop.





Table 3. Percentage of Time in Each Phase
D. CREW DEPLOYMENT CYCLES
The following crew rotation is selected to resemble a "steady state" process.
Crews are homeported in San Diego, California. A typical crew tour is outlined in Table
4. Sixteen weeks of initial training is followed by four weeks ofteam training conducted
in a simulator at the CTS. After qualifying in the simulator, the crew flies to the FOB for
crew turnover. After a one week turnover, the crew has two weeks to prepare the ship
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for deployment. The crew then deploys for 12 weeks to its primary theater of operations.
Upon returning from deployment to the FOB, the crew initiates an IMAV and has one
week to turn over the ship to the next crew. Once the crew returns to homeport, each
crew member receives 16 weeks of combined stand down and specialty training. The type
of specialty training is determined by the needs of the Navy and the professional
development of the sailor. Specialty training does not necessarily have to pertain to the
Arsenal Ship. The crew is reunited after the additional training phase and attends a 4
week team trainer in the Arsenal Ship simulator. After requalification, the deployment
cycle begins again. The crew returns to homeport after the 16 week deployment and is
detached from Arsenal Ship duty.
Phase Length
Initial training 16 weeks
Team training 4 weeks
Deployed 16 weeks
Additional training 16 weeks
Team training 4 weeks
Deployed 16 weeks
Table 4. Typical Arsenal Ship Crew Tour
The crew on a ship scheduled for overhaul has four weeks of additional time at sea
while returning the ship to homeport. Following arrival in homeport, they are relieved by
the overhaul crew. If the crew returning from deployment has completed two
deployments, they may request to stay onboard and augment the overhaul crew. At the
end ofthe overhaul, the overhaul crew turns the ship over to the scheduled deploying
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crew. The scheduled deploying crew transits to the primary theater, completes a
scheduled deployment and returns the Arsenal Ship to a FOB.
Because crew size is small and every individual is important, every effort is made
in the schedule to promote high morale, crew stability, and comprehensive individual and
team training. These standards should not be compromised for efficiency or cost savings
as such savings were gained by minimizing the crew size to start with.
E. SPECIAL EVOLUTIONS
1. Flight Operations
Flight operations will require full crew participation. Flight operations will be
utilized for all transfers at sea. Flyaway teams will be required to fly via fixed wing
aircraft to the closest aircraft carrier for further transfer via helicopter to the Arsenal Ship.









7. Chock and Chainman (2)
The Watch, Quarter and Station Bill (WQSB), Appendix B, outlines all manning
positions during flight quarters.
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2. Underway Replenishment
The Arsenal Ship will be designed for underway replenishment. However,
connected replenishment (CONREP) will not normally be required. The Arsenal Ship will
carry more than adequate fuel to remain deployed for 90 days. CONREP is manpower







Vertical replenishment (VERTREP) will be the normal replenishment method. A
non-organic helicopter supplied by the replenishment ship will be utilized. VERTREP is
much less manpower intensive than CONREP. VERTREP manning is the same as flight
operations manning except the chock and chainmen are cargo handlers.
The WQSB, Appendix B, outlines all manning positions during UNREP.
3. General Quarters
General Quarters will be required for two specific instances. Major damage
control and weapons launching will require entire crew involvement at their specialty
locations.
a. Launch
Since launching weapons is the Arsenal Ship's mission, it is the most




Major damage control is the most manpower intensive evolution the crew
will be required to perform. To insure maximum survivability, total crew involvement and








The WQSB, Appendix B, outlines all manning positions during General Quarters.
4. Concurrent Special Operations
Concurrent special operations are not possible with the proposed manning.
General Quarters for launching does not support damage control. Once damage is
anticipated or realized, the Arsenal Ship will be required to transition to the damage
control posture. A damage control posture includes the use of self defense weapons, but




In order to estimate the most cost-effective investment in automation, manning
costs incurred over the Arsenal Ship's expected 30 year service life must be determined.
To develop a manning LCC curve suitable for evaluating tradeoffs between manning levels
and automation, a minimum oftwo alternative manning structures are required. This
thesis develops four such manning structures. A simplified model, designed by the author
and calibrated to the Navy Billet Cost Factor (NBCF) Model results, is used to estimate
LCCs for each of the manning structures. The estimated costs of the four manning
structures are used to calculate a life cycle cost curve using regression analysis. This cost
curve is then used to examine the tradeoffs between manning levels and automation and to
estimate the most cost-effective investment in automation.
B. MANNING STRUCTURES
The Arsenal Ship manning cost curve is determined using four different manning
structures. One manning structure was determined by the TSSE design team, while the
other three structures were determined by the author. Table 5 is a comparison of the four
manning structures.
1. Structure One: Minimum
The first manning structure is based on the minimum manning level required by
existing law and practice for merchant ships as discussed in Chapter I.C. The Arsenal












CDR 1 1 1 1
LCDR 1 1 2 2
LT 3 3 6 7
BM1 1 1 1 1




EM2 1 2 2
EMC 2 2
EN1 3 3
EN2 2 1 1
ENC 1 1 2 2
ET1 1 2 2

















Total 10 22 44 50
Table 5. Arsenal Ship Manning Comparison
This structure does not require special manning for flight operations, underway
replenishment or General Quarters. The crew's responsibility is to monitor the Arsenal
Ship's systems for safety.
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2. Structure Two: Proposed
The second manning structure is a notional estimate proposed by the author. This
manning structure is based on a three section watch rotation with continuous watches on
the bridge, in combat information center (CIC), in sensor control, and in engineering. This
structure satisfies the manning requirements for flight operations, underway replenishment,
and General Quarters as discussed in Chapter II.E. The lower bound for this manning
structure is determined by the manning requirements for damage control since it is the
most manpower intensive evolution. Once a lower bound was established, the matching of
duties to personnel became a matter ofjob related abilities and the author's experience.
The ratings selected for the duties involved are not the focus of this thesis. Because
specific manning requirements cannot be determined until the Arsenal Ship design has
been accepted, the pay grades selected are the real focus. The manning requirement for
boat operations is eliminated by not embarking a small boat. The manning requirement for
a special physical security force is eliminated by training all personnel, arming all
watchstanders and providing access to additional weapons at each watchstation. The
WQSB, Appendix B, provides additional details about the proposed manning structure.
3. Structure Three: TSSE
The billet structure developed in the TSSE report is used for the third manning
structure. This structure is based on a four section watch rotation. Billets are separated
into two categories: Watchstanders and Special Evolutions. The WQSB for the TSSE
manning is reproduced as Appendix C. Additional manning for boat operations and
physical security is included in this structure.
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4. Structure Four: Maximum
The fourth manning structure is a notional estimate in which personnel were added
to the TSSE billet structure to achieve the maximum allowed crew of 50 personnel. One
officer, one chief petty officer and four second class petty officers were added to the
TSSE billet structure.
C. NAVY BILLET COST FACTOR MODEL
1. Background
The NBCF, Active Component Cost Estimation Model was utilized to calculate
the initial LCC estimates for the four manning structures. The model was developed for
the Bureau ofNaval Personnel by SAG Corporation in 1995, and is based on cost data
extracted from the Office of the Secretary ofDefense pay tables, allowance tables and
other Navy sources. The base year costs are in FY 94 dollars. The pay tables used were
effective January 1, 1995. FY 93 end strength was used as the current inventory and
budget data was extracted from the FY 93 - FY 94 President's Budget [Ref. 13].
An estimated cost for each rating and pay grade is calculated using a weighted
average approach. The following excerpt from the Navy Billet Cost Factor: Active
Component Cost Estimation Model Operations Manual [Ref. 13] explains how the
average basic pay is determined.
Average basic pay is determined by first multiplying
the inventory ofmembers of all grades, lengths of service
(LOS), and ratings by the basic pay rate. This figure is then
summed across LOS for each pay grade and rating and
divided by the total inventory for that pay grade and rating.
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This yields the average annual basic pay for each grade by
rating.
The model includes the following elements ofmanpower cost:
1
.
Military Compensation (Basic pay, Basic Allowance for Quarters, Basic
Allowance for Subsistence and Variable Housing Allowance)
2. Retired Pay Accrual
3. Selected Reenlistment Bonus
4. Special Pays (Hazardous Duty Pay, Flight Pay, Sea Pay etc.)
5. Training
6. Enlisted Recruiting
7. Medical Support (Military Hospitals and Civilian Health and Medical Program
for the Uniformed Services)
8. Other Benefits (Death Gratuities, Deserter Rewards, Survivor Benefits,
Clothing Allowances etc.)




2. Initial Life Cycle Cost Results
The 30 year LCC per ship was calculated for each manning structure using the
NBCF Model. The LCCs are based on constant FY 94 dollars for the entire 30 year life
cycle. The results are provided in Table 6.
19







Table 6. NBCF Model Results
Figure 1 provides the linear regression utilizing the results from the model. The
regression equation is:
30 Year Life Cycle Cost = (1.80 * Crew size) + 4.98 (1)
r
2


























10 15 20 25 30 35
Crew Size
40 45 50 55
Figure 1 . Initial Navy Billet Cost Factor Model Results
D. SIMPLIFIED BILLET COST MODEL
1. Background
The second model is a Simplified Billet Cost Model (SBCM) that was developed
by the author as a simplified and updated model to better suit the purposes of this thesis.
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The SBCM excludes data elements not required by this thesis and uses the maximum rate
per pay grade instead of a weighted average calculated from a previous end strength.
Since this thesis assumes that the Arsenal Ship will be homeported in a specific location,
namely San Diego, the SBCM was designed to utilize specific housing allowances rather
than the Navy-wide weighted average used by the NCBF Model. The SBCM can be
updated to accommodate housing allowances for any location. Finally, the SBCM
includes 1997 cost data obtained from the 1997 Navy Times Pay Chart [Ref. 14]. The
resulting SBCM utilizes an Excel® spreadsheet to calculate billet costs based on Basic
Pay, Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ), Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS),
Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) for San Diego, Retired Pay Accrual and various
projected annual inflation rates. Retired Pay Accrual is assumed to be 36.4% of basic pay
as in [Ref. 8].
2. Initial Life Cycle Cost Results
For comparison, the LCCs for each manning structure were calculated using the
SBCM. Pay tables [Ref. 15] effective January 1, 1995, were used to correspond with the
data in the NBCF model. To represent constant dollars, no annual inflation rate was used.
The 1993 VHA (with dependents) rates [Ref. 16] for San Diego were used realizing that
they probably do not match the weighted average VHA rate in 1993. The results are
provided in Table 7.
21







Table 7. SBCM Results
Figure 2 provides the linear regression utilizing the results from the model.. The
regression equation is:
30 Year Life Cycle Cost = (1.48 * Crew size) + 3.71 (2)
r
2

















Structure 1 : Mnimum
Structure 2 : Proposed
Structure 3 : TSSE
Structure 4 : Maximum
10 15 20 25 30 35
Crew Size
40 45 50 55
Figure 2. Initial Simplified Billet Cost Model Results
E. MODEL COMPARISON
As can be seen in Figure 3, both models produced similar slopes for the 30 year
manning LCC curve with constant dollars. The difference between the slopes is 0.32. The
22
SBCM underestimates manning LCCs because accession costs, healthcare costs, specialty
pay, etc. are not included in the model. To include an estimator for these costs and
calibrate the SBCM, the absolute difference between the models was calculated for each
manning structure. The proportionate difference was then calculated, to reduce the
compounding difference between the models as manning increased, using the NBCF
Model. The results are provided in Table 8. The mean proportionate difference is X =
0. 1861, with a standard deviation ofs = 0.0097. Since the distribution of the estimated
factor is unknown, Chebyshev's inequality is used to determine a confidence interval. A
correction factor of 0. 1 5 (X - 35) is used to maintain 94 percent confidence that the
true factor is not less than the estimate. Equation 3 shows the relationship between the
NCBF Model Estimate (Calibrated SBCM) and the SBCM.







































10 23.41 19.20 4.21 0.1797 22.78 0.63
22 43.79 35.01 8.78 0.2005 41.53 2.26
44 84.61 69.26 15.35 0.1815 82.16 2.45
50 94.68 77.37 17.31 0.1828 91.79 2.89
1
Proportionate Difference = Difference Between NBCF and SBCM /NBCF Results
2 NBCF Model Estimate = (0.15 * MBCF Model Result) + SBCM Result
Table 8. SBCM Calibration Utilizing the NBCF Model
NBCF Model Estimate = (0.15* NBCF Model Actual) + SBCM Results (3)
Since the NBCF Model Estimate is approximately equal (within 6%) to the NBCF
Model Actual Result, substituting the NBCF Model Estimate for the NBCF Model Actual
in Equation 3 and solving for the NBCF Model Estimate yields:
NBCF Model Estimate = 1 . 1 8 * SBCM = Calibrated SBCM (4)
The results from the NBCF Model , SBCM, and NCBF Model Estimate are
compared in Figure 4. The calibrated 30 year LCC curve is :
Calibrated 30 Year Life Cycle Cost = (1.75 * Crew size) + 3.74 (5)
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Figure 4. NBCF Model, SBCM, and NBCF Model Estimate Comparison
Since the SBCM underestimates the LCC, the maximum amount to spend in
automation will also be underestimated. This provides a built-in buffer ensuring the
maximum amount to spend on automation is not overestimated. The SBCM has the
advantage of being a spreadsheet model, which makes it easier to use. Furthermore, it can
be updated to include San Diego VHA rates and 1997 cost data which makes it more
accurate for the purposes of this thesis. Therefore, the calibrated SBCM was used to
produce the 30 year manning LCC curve using current year dollars and pay charts, which
is the basis for Arsenal Ship manning analysis in this thesis.
F. INDIVIDUAL ARSENAL SHIP MANNING ANALYSIS
Once the 30 year manning LCC curve is determined, it can be used to calculate the
cost of adding an additional billet to the billet structure of a single Arsenal Ship. The
slope of the curve is the cost per billet over the 30 year service life of the Arsenal Ship.
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The maximum amount available to invest in automation, while remaining cost-effective, is
determined by calculating the difference between the LCC of the current manning level
and the LCC of the proposed manning level and multiplying by the cost per billet obtained
from the slope ofthe LCC curve. For example, using the calibrated SBCM result
(Equation 5), the estimated maximum investment in automation to offset a reduction in
manning from 44 (Structure 3) to 22 (Structure 2), is $38.5 million.
G. ARSENAL SHIP TOTAL PROGRAM MANNING ANALYSIS
Since maintenance and training are supported ashore, the Squadron Staff and
Overhaul Detachment in homeport as well as the Maintenance Detachments at the FOBs
must also be considered. As the number of deploying personnel is reduced, the number of
support personnel ashore must increase if maintenance requirements remain the same. In
some cases, maintenance requirements may increase as the maintenance responsibility is
shifted ashore. In order to calculate manning costs, a proposed manning structure had to
be designed. Appendix B details a proposed Squadron Staff and Overhaul Detachment as
well as a proposed Maintenance Detachment for the purpose of this thesis.
Now that a model to determine the cost of additional manning per ship has been
developed, the total program cost of adding an additional billet to the Arsenal Ship can be
calculated. Since this thesis assumes a crew deploys from a FOB every four weeks and it
takes 36 weeks to cycle a crew, as discussed in Chapter II, nine crews are required to man
five Arsenal Ships. Therefore, each additional billet costs the total Arsenal Ship program
nine times the cost of adding a single billet to one ship.
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H. AUTOMATION COST
In addition to calculating the LCC curve for manning, the cost curve for manning
vs. automation is useful. Minimizing the combined LCC for manning and the cost curve
for automation identifies an initial crew target size and the optimal investment in
automation. The automation cost curve should be calculated by each contractor and
supplied as part of their bid proposal since it is dependent on how their design implements
innovations in automation. The Navy currently has no data base for estimating a manning
vs. automation cost curve. The Naval Center for Cost Analysis maintains the Navy's
historical data using the Navy Visibility and Management of Operations and Support Costs
(VAMOSC) [Ref 13]. VAMOSC does not contain the data required to calculate an
automation cost curve since there are no systems specifically designed for the purpose of
reduced manning.
The civilian sector does maintain automation cost data. McDermott Shipbuilding
Incorporated provided automation cost data for a 524 ft. container ship. Their designs
include unmanned engine rooms, with crew sizes ranging from 13 to 19 personnel. The
manning structure for a crew of 19 is provided in Table 9. The cost of automation, to
reduce a crew by approximately 20 personnel, is $275,000 to $325,000 in material and
5,000 man hours of labor [Ref. 14 ]. Since a container ship does not man weapon
systems, the cost of automation is in updating engineering and bridge control stations.
The TSSE design team calculated a unit cost of $487 million for the Arsenal ship.
This includes the acquisition cost of the T-AO, combat systems upgrades, and automation


















Fitter (cook help) 1
Seaman 4
Motormen 3
Table 9. Manning Design by McDermott Shipbuilding Inc.
the Arsenal Ship, the acquisition cost ($167 million) and the Vertical Launch System cost
($215 million) are subtracted from the unit cost since neither cost contributes to
automation. The remainder, approximately $105 million, is the estimated cost of
automating the Arsenal Ship under the TSSE design. Not all ofthe $105 million is
directly related to automation cost. Therefore, this is an overestimate of automation cost.
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IV. RESULTS
A. INDIVIDUAL ARSENAL SHD? MANNING RESULTS
1. Constant Dollars
A 30 year manning LCC for a single Arsenal Ship was calculated using the
calibrated SBCM along with 1997 pay charts and 1997 VHA rates for San Diego. Table
10 provides the results from the model.








Table 10. Calabrated SBCM Results
Figure 5 provides the linear regression utilizing the results from the model. The
regression equation is:
30 Year Life Cycle Cost = (1.83 * Crew size) + 4.40 (6)
2
_r = 0.9990; n = 4; p = 0.0005
29













Structure 3 Structure 4
Structure 2
Structure 1
Structure 1 : Mnimum
Structure 2 : Proposed
Structure 3: TSSE
Structure 4 : Maximum
10 15 20 25 30 35
Crew Size
40 45 50 55
Figure 5. Simplified Billet Cost Model Results, Constant FY 97 Dollars
The 30 year manning LCC curve slope of 1.83 remains consistent with the cost
curves obtained from the NBCF and the SBCM in Chapter III. Using Equation 6 above,
the maximum investment in automation (constant FY 97 dollars) to offset a reduction in
manning from 44 (Structure 3) to 22 (Structure 2) is $40.3 million. When considering the
construction of a single Arsenal Ship, using the TSSE design, it would be cost-effective to
spend an additional $40.3 million in automation to reduce the crew size by 22 crew
members. The total TSSE design cost would increase from $487 million to $527 million,
which is below the maximum allowed acquisition cost of $550 million [Ref. 9].
2. Inflation
Since automation cost is considered an initial investment cost in this thesis,
inflation does not affect automation cost. However, inflation does affect manning cost
throughout the 30 year service life. Therefore, a 30 year manning LCC for a single
30
Arsenal Ship was calculated using the calibrated SBCM with an annual three percent
inflation rate, 1997 pay charts and 1997 VHA rates for San Diego. Table 1 1 provides the
results from the model.








Table 1 1 . Calabrated SBCM Results with 3% Annual Inflation
Figure 6 provides the linear regression utilizing the results from the model. The
regression equation is:
30 Year Life Cycle Cost = (2.91 * Crew size) + 6.98 (7)
r
2

















Structure 1 : Mnimum
Structure 2 : R-oposed
Structure 3 : TSSE
Structure 4 : Maximum
10 15 20 25 30 35
Crew Size
40 45 50 55
Figure 6. Simplified Billet Cost Model Results, 3% Annual Inflation
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Using the TSSE design and Equation 7, it would be cost-effective to spend $64
million on automation to reduce the crew size from 44 to 22 crew members. The total
TSSE design cost would increase from $487 million to $551 million, which is one million
dollars more than the maximum allowed acquisition cost.
B. ARSENAL SHIP TOTAL PROGRAM MANNING RESULTS
1. Additional Billet Costs
Now that the cost of additional manning per ship has been determined, the impact
of adding an Arsenal Ship billet to the entire Arsenal Ship program can also be calculated.
As discussed in Chapter III.G, each additional Arsenal Ship billet costs nine times the cost
of a single billet. Since inflation affects manning cost, Equation 7 is utilized. The slope
from Equation 7 is multiplied by nine to calculate the cost when adding an Arsenal Ship
billet to the Arsenal Ship program. Therefore, the cost of adding one Arsenal Ship billet is
$26 million ($2.85 million * 9). The maximum cost-effective investment in automation to
reduce the crew size by 22 crew members is $572 million. Consequently, $1 14.4 million
would be available for automation in each of the five ships. This method to estimate the
investment in automation is valid as long as the number of ships and the number of crews
required to man the ships are known.
2. Annual Manning Costs
Using the calibrated SBCM, Equation 6 (constant FY 97 dollars), and the manning
structures detailed in Appendix B, the estimated manning cost of a Squadron Staff and
Overhaul crew is $7.7 million per year while the estimated manning cost of each FOB
maintenance detachment is $5.6 million per year. Therefore, the total annual program
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manning cost is approximately $32 million for five Arsenal Ships with manning Structure 2
and two FOBs. Figure 7 displays a proportional representation of the annual total
program manning cost.
Annual Arsenal Ship Total Program Manning Cost
Squadron
24%
^— ||lll£ ^sH^?*^ Arsenal Ships
immmmmmm ~ 41%
^:':-: ::v:-/\>>->-:x^-:->:-:':^ : :^:V:-:-:-:':-r:'^?t-. : ,^-rKr*^x ;: : ; ::-; ; : :^: ; :: : : :
FOBs
35%
Figure 7. Proportional Annual Total Program Manning Cost Using Structure 2
C. AUTOMATION RESULTS
Before the automation cost curves are discussed, a modification to the 30 year
LCC must be identified. Since the automation cost curve will reflect the cost of
automation for one ship, the 30 year manning LCC must be scaled to reflect the mean cost
of manning per ship. This thesis identified nine crews for five ships. Therefore, the LCC
curve must be factored by 9/5. The modified 30 year LCC curve is:
Mean 30 Year Life Cycle Cost = (5.24 * Crew size) + 12.56 (8)
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1. Linear Automation Cost Curve
After identifying a 30 year LCC curve and an automation cost curve, the combined
cost curves can be used to identify an initial target crew size and optimal investment in
automation. Since generalized automation cost data is unavailable and the cost curve
depends on the particular technology utilized, the author developed an automation cost
curve for illustration purposes only. Assuming the TSSE design can be manned by a crew
of 100 with minimal automation cost ($1 million) and the estimated automation cost for a
crew of44 calculated in Chapter III.G ($105 million) is reasonable, the automation cost
to reduce manning by 54 crew members (100 - 44) is $104 million. This yields an
automation cost slope of 1.9. Using this slope and the TSSE design cost of $105 million
for a crew of 44
,
the following linear automation cost curve was formulated:
Automation Cost (millions) = (-1.9 * Crew size) + 189 (9)
Treating the mean LCC curve as a supply curve and the linear automation curve as
a demand curve, the optimal investment in automation can be determined by adding the
two curves. The minimum point on the combined curve (called the average total cost
curve in economics) is the optimal investment in automation. The mean LCC curve
(Equation 8), linear automation cost curve (Equation 9) and the combined cost curve are
depicted in Figure 8. In this example, the target crew size is 0, or the minimum point of
the combined cost curve. This corresponds to a 30 year manning LCC of $13 million.
The optimal investment in automation is $189 million. The total combined investment in
manning and automation is $202 million per ship. The results indicate that a linear
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Figure 8. Linear Automation cost vs. Mean 30 Year Manning Life Cycle Cost
2. Exponential Automation Cost Curve
As the crew size approaches zero, the expected cost of technology increases
dramatically. Therefore, the automation cost per man increases rapidly as well. On the
other hand, as crew size approaches a level in which a four section watch rotation can be
implemented, the cost of automation approaches zero because the manning can be reduced
by reducing the watch rotation. Therefore, an exponential function was also formulated
because it produces more realistic results at the tails. A substantially large value, the
maximum allowed procurement cost for the Arsenal Ship ($550 million), was selected as
the cost for total automation (y-intercept). Lambda was determined by forcing the
function through the estimated automation cost of $105 million for 44 crew members and
solving for lambda. The following exponential automation cost curve was formulated:
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Automation Cost (millions) = 550 e^
*
Crew size)
where X = 0.04 (10)
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Figure 9. Exponential Automation Cost vs. Mean 30 Year Manning Life Cycle Cost
The mean 30 year manning LCC curve (Equation 8), exponential automation cost
curve (Equation 10) and combined cost curve are depicted in Figure 9. The target crew
size from the exponential automation cost curve is 36 for a 30 year manning LCC of $200
million. The optimal investment in automation is $130 million and the total investment in
manning is $330 million per ship. However, the combined cost curve is so flat around the
minimum that a manning level anywhere between 24 and 49 appears to be justified. This




Inflation rates tend to fluctuate, therefore, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on
inflation. As discussed in Chapter IV.A. 2, an increase in inflation will increase the initial
investment in automation. The 30 year manning LCC curve from Equation 8, with 2%,
3% and 4% inflation rates is displayed in Figure 10. An increase in annual inflation from
the baseline assumption of3% to 4% will increase the manning LCC for the TSSE design























Figure 10. Inflation Sensitivity Analysis
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2. Cost Curves
a. Linear Cost Curve
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on the linear automation cost curve by
adjusting the slope and resolving for the intercept. The linear cost curve indicates that a
combination ofmaximum automation and zero manning is optimal, until the magnitude of
the slope is equal to the magnitude of the mean 30 year manning LCC curve as displayed
in Figure 8. When these magnitudes are equal, the slope of the combined cost curve is
zero as in Figure 1 1. In this case, the minimum combined cost is $233 million. However
an unlimited number of cost-effective automation/manning combinations exists. If the
magnitude of the automation cost curve slope exceeds the magnitude of the mean 30 year
manning LCC curve, the linear cost curve indicates no automation, as in Figure 12.
Therefore, a linear automation cost curve provides an all or nothing result and should be
avoided if possible.
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Figure 1 1 . Sensitivity Analysis of Linear Automation Cost Curve (slope = -5.17)
38







I I i I i i i i i i i i I i i i I i I i i i i i [ i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i ii
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54
Crew Size
• Mean Lite Cycle Cost Linear Automation Cost Combined Cost
Figure 12. Sensitivity Analysis of Linear Automation Cost Curve ( slope = -7 )
b. Exponential Cost Curve
Sensitivity analysis was also conducted on the exponential automation cost
curve by adjusting lambda + 0.01 . Since the LCC curve has an increasing slope and the
exponential cost curve has a decreasing slope, the minimum of the combined cost curve is
where the slopes have the same magnitude with different signs. Equation 1 1 is the
combined cost curve using the LCC curve (Equation 8) and the automation cost curve
(Equation 10) with lambda = 0.03.




Taking the first derivative with respect to crew size yields:
5.24 - l 6 .5e-(003*Crcwsizc) (12)
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Setting Equation 12 equal to zero and solving for crew size produces a minimum crew
size of 38. Following the same procedure for lambda = 0.05, a crew size of 34 is
obtained.
The minimum cost and crew size can also be determined by graphing the
magnitude of the slopes as displayed in Figure 13. Figure 14 displays the change in
combined cost with respect to a change in lambda.. The crew size ranges from 34 to 39,
while the optimal investments in automation range from $100 million to $171 million.
Therefore, the optimal investment in automation is sensitive to the slope of the exponential
cost curve; however, the target crew size is not very sensitive to changes in the slope.
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Figure 13. Sensitivity Analysis ofExponential Automation Cost Curve
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As the intensifying national concern over the federal deficit continues to impact the
budget for national defense, innovations in automation must be utilized to reduce LCCs.
However, safety must not be sacrificed to achieve this goal. A tradeoff analysis between
automation and manning should be conducted early in the design phase. Since the process
of designing ships is changing, commencing with the Arsenal Ship, an excellent
opportunity exists to incorporate manning analysis into the design phase.
This thesis identified the manning requirements and the operational requirements
affecting manning as outlined in the ASRD. The TSSE design concept was adopted as a
baseline for manning. To determine the required number of ships and crews, separate
deployment cycles were developed for the Arsenal Ship and the Arsenal Ship crew. The
manning structures for special evolutions were developed to assist in identifying minimum
manning levels. Damage control manning was determined to be the overall limiting factor.
The SBCM is a simplified, updated costing model designed to calculate a 30 year manning
LCCs for different manning structures. The TSSE design manning structure was used as
the starting point to develop three additional manning structures. Using these four
structures and data from the mid 1990s, the results from the SBCM, were compared to the
NBCF Model. After the SBCM was calibrated, both models produced similar results.
Therefore, the SBCM was used to compute 30 year manning LCCs for the four structures
using 1997 pay tables. The LCCs were then used to determine 30 year LCC curves,
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which were used to conduct cost tradeoff analysis between manning and shipboard
automation. Finally, the 30 year LCC curve, in conjunction with an automation cost
curve, can also be utilized to calculate an initial crew target size and an optimal investment
in automation. This thesis is intended as an analysis tool; it does not provide the answer to
minimum manning requirements for the Arsenal Ship because the cost of automation per
billet saved does not exist in the Navy cost data.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The Arsenal Ship resembles a logistics platform which is intended to go in harm's
way. Therefore, it should be designed for minimum manning. Manning vs. automation
tradeoff analysis should be implemented in the design phase of all ships. However, before
outfitting ships with the latest technological advances in automation, manning and
projected operational tempo (OPTEMPO) should be analyzed. Manning structures should
be compared after identifying the limiting factor or factors, which is damage control in this
thesis.
Deployment cycles for crews and ships should be designed as a "steady state"
process. Slack should be included to allow room for adjustment without causing a ripple
effect as minor delays arise. The deployment schedule developed for this thesis requires
five, not six, Arsenal Ships. Four are forward deployed at two FOBs, while one is in
overhaul at homeport. This allows 100 percent coverage oftwo theaters of operation.
The training and deployment cycle requires nine deployment crews. Four of the nine are
embarked and five of the nine are in training or in transit to or from the FOBs.
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The data required to support an automation cost curve is not readily available in
the Navy. However, as systems are designed or modified for the purpose of reduced
manning, the data should be collected and analyzed. With increasing manning cost,
retrofitting ships with the technology which does not support reduced manning is ill-
advised. Every billet in the Arsenal Ship should be completely justified.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
I recommend challenging the design teams to build an Arsenal Ship that balances
marginal automation cost with marginal manning cost. Efficiencies in manning must be
realized as budgets are reduced. The design concept should force reductions in manning
towards the lower bound, whether the lower bound is cost related or technology related.
The NBCF Model should be updated to provide more flexibility. The current
model's options are limited and updating the data is a very difficult if not an impossible
task. A model that cannot be updated by the user becomes inaccurate and thus obsolete
quickly.
Program managers should be encouraged to conduct automation vs. manning
tradeoff analysis prior to solicitation of contracts. Likewise, contractors should provide
their automation vs. manning tradeoff analysis early in the contract process to ensure such
analysis is a part of the design phase.
D. FURTHER STUDY
Since this thesis does not have the information to develop a valid automation cost
curve, the most obvious area for further research is to compile actual or reasonable data
and compute an automation cost curve as a function of watchstanding and other crew
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functions. Likewise, this thesis does not identify the cost of maintaining and operating an
Arsenal Ship training simulator, which is an important part of the training process
developed in Chapter II.
The NBCF Model could also be updated and revised to include more options. For
instance, cost comparisons for different geographical regions could be conducted if the
model allowed separate VHA rates to be identified rather than using a weighted average.
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APPENDIX A. DEPLOYMENT CYCLES






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX B. PROPOSED MANNING
This appendix contains the proposed Arsenal Ship, Maintenance Detachment, and
Squadron Staff and Overhaul Detachment manning structures designed by the author.
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APPENDIX C. TOTAL SHIP SYSTEM ENGINEERING DESIGN
This appendix contains a reproduction of the Naval Postgraduate School's Total














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX D. SIMPLIFIED BILLET COST MODEL RESULTS
This appendix contains the Excel® spreadsheet format utilized for the SBCM
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